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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Cynthia Marie

of grand

theft.

Munson

She claims the

appeals from her judgment of conviction for three counts

district court

abused

allowing the state to present evidence 0f a
Victim, abused

its

discretion

evidence, and abused

its

Of The

Facts

Munson was

discretion

civil settlement

its

by

between Munson and the
payroll ﬁle into

by excluding polygraph evidence.

Munson

also

discretion in sentencing.

And Course Of The

Proceedings

a longtime employee and

coworker discovered some “payroll
investigation that revealed

discretion during the court trial

by admitting a screenshot 0f Munson’s

claims the district court abused

Statement

its

CFO

of Pioneer

irregularities,”

Title.1

(PSI, p.3.) After a

Pioneer Title launched an internal

Munson “had been misappropriating

funds in a variety of ways

over a long period of time.” (PSL, p.3.) The company alleged three basic categories of
misappropriation: 1)

Munson was

regularly receiving a

mid-month advance 0n her

salary,

but not deducting those advances from her monthly end pay, resulting in a signiﬁcant

overpayment of her salary every month; 2) Munson was not paying her

full shares

of her

401(k) and beneﬁts packages, resulting in Pioneer Title overpaying for those items; and

3)

on multiple occasions, Munson paid herself unauthorized bonuses using company

checks and a stamp with the

1

The

state

CEO’S

signature. (PSI, p.177.) Pioneer Title concluded that,

adopts Munson’s convention of referring to Pioneer Title, Pioneer Holding

Company (Munson’s

technical employer), and the various other relevant Pioneer Title

companies with the shorthand 0f “Pioneer

Title.”

(E Rev. Appellant’s

brief, p.1 n.

1 .)

excluding interest,

Title

Munson

and Munson reached a

claims,

Munson

resigned,

civil settlement in

which Pioneer

Title

waived

and—without admitting wrongdoing—Munson agreed

(and eventually did repay) the $1.3 million. (R., p.90; Rev.

Following the

civil settlement a

Pioneer

(Rev. Tr., p.1317, Ls.8-14.2)

stole $1.3 million.

Tr.,

grand jury indicted

its

civil

to repay

p.814, Ls.8-22.)

Munson on

four counts: 1)

grand theft “by taking payroll advances and not deducting them from her end 0f the

month

payroll check”; 2) grand theft “by deceiving [Pioneer Title] into believing she

contributing t0 her 401(k) package and/or beneﬁts package so [Pioneer Title]
contribute to her 401(k) package and/or beneﬁts package”; 3) grand theft

was

would

by “writing

checks t0 herself in amounts not approved by Pioneer Title”; and 4) forgery, “by creating
and/or using a forged signature stamp.” (R., pp.24-25.)

Many pretrial
t0 introduce evidence

motions ensued.
0f the

(E R.)

civil settlement

These included the

agreement

at trial.

state’s

(R.,

404(b) motion

pp.146-54, 157-58.)

Munson made

a motion in limine t0 exclude the civil settlement evidence; she argued

was

and otherwise inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 408.

irrelevant

93.)

The

that the

district court

state

it

(R., pp.86-

granted the state’s motion and partially denied Munson’s, holding

could introduce evidence of the

civil

settlement, but

“would not be

permitted t0 argue that the defendant admitted guilt 0r wrongdoing as part 0f the civil

agreement”

(R., pp.361, 363-64.)

Later 0n, the state

made

a motion in limine to prohibit

Munson from

presenting

polygraph evidence that purportedly showed she was being truthﬁJI about the charges.

2

Citations herein t0 “Rev. Tr.” refer to the revised

2019.

trial transcript

lodged on March 31,

(R.,

pp.751-52; Rev.

Tr.,

the polygraph evidence

Munson waived
had an 11-day court

Munson

p.696, Ls.10-25.)

was

The

district court

inadmissible. (TL, p.663, L.1

her right t0 a jury

trial in late

trial

2016 (Rev.

granted the motion, holding

— p.664,

L.14.)

(Rev. Tr., p.542, L.17

Tr.,

—

pp.531-644, 741-2317).

objected to the state’s introduction of State’s Exhibit 10, which

0f Munson’s payroll ﬁle.

(Rev. T11, p.1068, L.13

showed

explained, the payroll ﬁle

p.546,

“that advance

— p.1090,

L.15.)

L8) and

During

trial,

was a screenshot

As

the state later

and 401(k) Withdrawal and health

insurance contributions had not been deducted from the ﬁnal payroll.” (Rev. Tr., p.1227,

L.1

— p.1228,

L.16.)

Munson

business record” that

Ls.9-16.)

The

argued,

was “kept

district court

among

in the

other things, that the payroll ﬁle

normal course 0f business.”

overruled Munson’s objection.

was “not a

(Rev. Tr., p.1089,

(Rev. Tr., p.1084, L.21

—

p.1085, L.3; p.1090, Ls.12-15.)

Following the

trial,

the district court convicted

Grand Theft but acquitted her of the Forgery count.

Munson was

(R.,

Munson 0f

the three counts 0f

pp.1043-45.)

sentenced t0 concurrent fourteen-year sentences, With four years

ﬁxed, on the ﬁrst two counts, With a consecutive indeterminate sentence 0f six years 0n
the remaining count.

(R., p.1050.)

twenty years With four years ﬁxed.

Munson
1056—65.)

This amounted to an imposed aggregate sentence of

(R., p.1050.)

timely appealed from the judgment 0f conviction.

(R.,

pp.1049-1053,

ISSUES

Munson

states the issues

on appeal

as:

Ms. Munson’s
motion t0 exclude evidence 0f the Settlement Agreement under
Idaho Rule of Evidence 408?

I.

Did the

II.

Did

abuse

district court

its

the district court abuse

discretion in denying

its

discretion in admitting a computer

screenshot of Ms. Munson’s electronic payroll ﬁle under the

business records exception to the hearsay rule?

III.

Did

the district court abuse

Munson

its

discretion

by not allowing Ms.

to introduce, in rebuttal, evidence regarding a polygraph

examination she took Which indicated she was being truthful in her
denial of wrongdoing?

IV.

Did

the district court abuse

Munson

t0

its

discretion

When

it

sentenced Ms.

an aggregate uniﬁed term of twenty years, With four

years ﬁxed, considering the signiﬁcant mitigating factors that exist
in this case?

(Rev. Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Munson

show

failed to

state t0 present

the district court abused

evidence regarding the

its

discretion

by allowing the
was any

civil settlement; 0r alternatively,

such error harmless?

II.

Has Munson

show

failed t0

the district court abused

its

discretion

by admitting

the

payroll ﬁle evidence?

III.

Has Munson

failed t0

show

the district court abused

its

discretion

by excluding

evidence regarding the polygraph examination; 0r alternatively, was any such
error harmless?

Has Munson

failed t0

show

the district court abused

its

sentencing discretion?

ARGUMENT
I.

Munson Fails To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion BV Allowing The State
T0 Present The Civil Settlement Evidence; Alternatively, Any Such Error Was Harmless
A.

Introduction

Munson

argues the district court abused

its

by allowing the

discretion

state to

present evidence and testimony regarding the civil settlement. She contends that pursuant

t0 I.R.E. 408, evidence

0f a

civil settlement

was

(Rev. Appellant’s brief,

inadmissible.

pp.8-13.)

Munson
t0

show

that

by allowing

fails t0

that the district court

abused

the civil settlement evidence t0

come

in

discretion: “(1)

whether the

if the district court erred

any such error was harmless.

Of Review

Idaho’s appellate court examine three factors

(2)

discretion, because she fails

its

Rule 408 applies in a criminal case. Finally, even

Standard

B.

show

whether the
trial

trial

When reviewing

court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;

court acted within the boundaries 0f its discretion and consistent with

the legal standards applicable t0 the speciﬁc choices available t0

trial

court reached

a claimed abuse of

its

decision

by an exercise 0f reason.”

it;

Schoger

and

(3)

Whether the

V. State,

148 Idaho

622, 627, 226 P.3d 1269, 1274 (2010).

C.

Rule 408 Would Not Exclude The Admission

Of Civil

Settlement Evidence In

A

Criminal Trial

Munson made

a motion in limine for an order “[p]rohibiting the State from

producing any evidence, testimonial or otherwise, in

its

case-in-chief of the civil

agreement between” Munson and Pioneer
State

Title,

and moved for an order “[p]rohibiting the

from making any argument 0r comment before the jury

between the Defendant and the group of Pioneer
guilt or otherwise signiﬁes a consciousness

was

that the civil settlement

0f

Title

guilt.”

irrelevant, and, “[u]nder

agreement

that the civil

companies

is

(R., pp.86-87.)

an admission of

Munson argued

Rule 408 0f the Idaho Rules of

Evidence, evidence of a compromise or offer t0 compromise a disputed claim

is

inadmissible to prove liability as to that claim.” (R., p.91.)

The

district court

evidence of the

denied Munson’s motion to prohibit the

civil settlement.

the court noted the motion

from introducing

Without speciﬁcally referring

(R., p.361.)

was being denied

state

“for the reasons set forth” in

to

its

analysis of

As

the state’s counterpart motion to admit the evidence under 404(b). (R., p.361 .)

motion

t0 prohibit “the state

999
from making ‘any argument

district court

it

in part.

(R.,

an

guilt,” the district court

p.361 (quoting R., p.87).)

The

held that “the prosecution would be permitted to argue the agreement as

consciousness 0f

guilt;

however, the prosecutor would not be permitted to argue that

defendant admitted guilt or wrongdoing as part 0f the

argument would misstate the agreement.”
Rule 408, as written
Evidence 0f

(1)

at the

agreement because such an

(R., p.361.)

time 0f this

furnishing,

civil

trial,

offering,

stated that:

or promising to furnish, or (2)

accepting, offering, 0r promising t0 accept, a valuable consideration in

compromising 0r attempting
to

for the

that the civil settlement “is

admission 0f guilt or otherwise signiﬁes a consciousness of
denied the motion in part and granted

Rule 408,

either validity 0r

to

amount,

compromise a claim Which was disputed
is

not admissible to prove liability

as

for,

amount of the claim or any other claim. Evidence of
conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not
invalidity of, or

admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion 0f any evidence

otherwise discoverable merely because

compromise
evidence

is

negotiations.

it

is

presented in the course 0f

This rule does not require exclusion

if the

offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice

of a Witness, negativing

[sic]

a contention 0f undue delay, or proving an

effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.

Compromise

negotiations encompass meditation.

Rule 408—patterned

after a prior version

0f the counterpart federal rule—reﬂects

a “strong public policy favoring amicable settlement of litigation.” Quick V. Crane, 111

Idaho 759, 780, 727 P.2d 1187, 1208 (1986).

Rule 408

is

“given a broad, not narrow,

interpretation in order to encourage settlement negotiations.” Proﬁts Plus Capital

LLC

V. Podesta,

156 Idaho 873, 889, 332 P.3d 785, 801 (2014).

With

Mgmt.,

that said, “trial

judges have broad discretion in determining the admissibility of such evidence and their
decision ‘will not be overturned absent a clear showing 0f abuse.’” Crane, 111 Idaho at

780, 727 P.2d at 1208 (quoting Soria V. Sierra Paciﬁc Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 606,

726 P.2d 706, 718 (1986).

N0

Idaho appellate court has addressed the question presented here: Whether Rule

408 would apply
settlement.

3

in criminal proceedings, prohibiting the admission

There

is

of evidence 0f a

civil

a longstanding3 federal circuit split over whether the counterpart

2006 amendment t0 F.R.E. 408 some commentators have concluded that “it
is now clear that [federal] Rule 408 applies in criminal cases as well as in civil cases.”
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Federal Rule ovaidence 408 and Criminal Cases, 26 CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 1 (Spring 2011).
Solely because the 2006 amendment “drew a distinction
the government and civil disputes involving private
involving
civil
between
disputes
parties—and in the former situation, the settlement evidence was not prohibited in a
subsequent criminal case—some have concluded that “it became clear on the face of the
rule that it reached criminal prosecutions.” Li. The D.C. and Sixth circuit seem t0 agree.
Da_vis, 596 F.3d at 860; McAuliffe V. United States, 514 F. App’x 542, 549 (6th Cir.
2013 (unpublished)). But even assuming that conclusion is sound it would have no
bearing on the analysis here: because Idaho Rule 408 has not been amended in the same
fashion as the federal rule, any inferences drawn from those amendments are simply
In light of a

E

inapplicable here.

federal

On one

Rule 408 would apply t0 criminal proceedings.

side of the aisle, the Fifth,

Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. circuits have concluded that Rule 408 “bar[s] settlement

evidence in both criminal and

1146 (10th

civil

proceedings.” United States V. Bailey, 327 F.3d 1131,

United States

Cir. 2003);

Hays, 872 F.2d 582, 589 (5th Cir. 1989); United

V.

States V. Arias, 431 F.3d 1327, 1336-38 (11th Cir. 2005); United States V. Davis,

F.3d 852, 860-61 (D.C.

On

Cir. 2010).

have concluded the opposite:

that

the other side, the

Second and Seventh

596

circuits4

Rule 408 would not apply in criminal cases because

“the underlying policy considerations 0f Rule 408 are inapplicable in criminal cases.”

Manko

V.

United

States,

The conclusion

87 F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d

that

and should be adopted by
34 F.3d 436 (7th
civil

proceedings’

Rule 408

is

Cir. 1996).

inapplicable in criminal cases

As noted by

this Court.

that “[t]he public interest in the prosecution

in the settlement

it

should only apply t0

”speciﬁcally the language concerning validity and amount 0f a

claim.” 34 F.3d at 439. But even if this language

is

better reasoned,

the court in United States V. Prewitt,

Cir. 1994), the rule’s text itself “suggests that

9

is

of civil disputes.”

Li.

is

ambiguous, the correct interpretation

of crime

is

greater than the public interest

The Ma_nko Court explained

that,

The primary purpose of Rule 408 is the “promotion of the public policy
favoring the compromise and settlement 0f disputes” that would otherwise
be discouraged With the admission of such evidence. Rule 408, advisory

4

At one time the Sixth

proceedings.

circuit also

United States

footnote 3, supra,

it is

V.

agreed that Rule 408 would not apply in criminal

Logan, 250 F.3d 350 (6th

highly doubtful that the Sixth circuit would

does not apply in criminal proceedings. In McAuliffe

V.

But as noted in
hold that Rule 408

Cir. 2001).
still

United States, 5 14

F.

App’x 542,

549 (6th Cir. 2013 (unpublished)), the Sixth circuit, like the D.C. circuit, concluded that
2006 federal amendment “conclusively settled” the circuit split, abrogating Logan.
However, this change 0f heart—based solely on the 2006 federal amendment—does not
matter here.
Unlike the federal rule, Idaho’s Rule 408 does not contain the 2006
the

amendment language. Compare

I.R.E.

408

m

F.R.E. 408.

committee’s notes.
probative

T0

further

excluded from

is

[United States V. Gonzalez,

this

goal,

civil lawsuits.

evidence that
Nonetheless, as

otherwise

is

we

stated in

748 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir.1984)], the policy

underlies Rule 408 does not apply t0 criminal prosecutions.

that

The policy

favoring the encouragement of civil settlements, sufﬁcient t0 bar their

admission in

civil actions, is insufﬁcient, in

our View, to outweigh the

need for accurate determinations in criminal cases where the stakes are
higher. It makes n0 difference, in this regard, Whether the settlement
evidence

is

being offered by the government, as in Gonzalez, or by the
Thus we reafﬁrm our conclusion in Gonzalez that

defense, as in this case.

the underlying policy considerations 0f Rule

408 are inapplicable

in

criminal cases.

87 F.3d 50, 54-55.

Washington’s Supreme Court likewise concluded that “the policy favoring

m

settlements, though sufﬁcient in a civil case to bar evidence relating t0 settlements

offers t0 settle, is insufﬁcient in criminal cases ‘Where the stakes are higher.’”

civil

and

O’Connor, 155 Wash. 2d 335, 346, 119 P.3d 806, 812 (2005) (quoting Ma_nk0, 87 F.3d
54).

Because “[w]hen weighed directly against the public

civil suits, the public interest in the disclosure

greater.

Encouraging settlement 0f a

civil

interest in the settlement

and prosecution of crimes

is

at

of

certainly

matter surely ‘does not justify excluding

probative and otherwise admissible evidence in criminal prosecutions.”’ Li. (quoting

United States

V.

Gonzalez, 748 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir.1984)).

agrees: because “the public interest in presenting ‘probative

Utah’s Supreme Court

and otherwise admissible

evidence in criminal prosecutions’ outweighs ‘the public interest in the settlement 0f civil

disputes,
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the “admissions and statements

private parties

are admissible in

made

at a

conference t0

any criminal proceeding.”

1115, 1128 (Utah 2001 (quoting Gonzalez, 748 F.2d at 78)).

State V.

settle

claims 0f

Mead, 27 P.3d

This Court should join the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, and Washington’s

and Utah’s high courts

in adopting the better reasoned rule: because the public interest in

the disclosure and prosecution of crimes

disputes,

show

is

greater than the public interest in settling civil

As

Rule 408 should not apply in criminal cases.

the district court abused

its

such,

Munson

has failed t0

discretion in allowing the state to present the civil

settlement evidence.

D.

The Civil Settlement Evidence Was Inadmissible Under 408, The
Admission Of The Evidence Was Harmless

Even

Even
motion

If

if the district court

in limine, that error

did err by partially denying Munson’s Rule 408-based

“A

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

defendant

appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally—based error shall have the duty to
establish that such an error occurred, at

demonstrating that the error

is

Which point the

State shall

have the burden of

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State

Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010).

“In other words, the error

Court ﬁnds that the result would be the same Without the error.”
163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017) (citing State

V.

is

V. Per_ry,

harmless

State V.

150

if the

Montgomery,

Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598,

301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013)). This Court has previously applied the harmless error standard
t0 alleged Violations

of Rule 408. Soria

V. Sierra Pac. Airlines, Inc.,

111 Idaho 594, 606,

726 P.2d 706, 718 (1986). (“Our review here, however, need not center around Whether
the trial court abused

t0 the jury,

resulting

because

from the

its

we

broad discretion in refusing to disclose contents of the agreement
hold

that,

even

if the trial court

district court’s decision

did

err,

Which would warrant

10

there

was n0 prejudice

reversal.”)

Here, regardless 0f the civil settlement evidence, the result would have been the

The

same.

that

state

presented voluminous evidence over an 11-day court

Munson committed grand

Argument” summarizing

And

it

(ﬂ

theft.

the evidence presented at

was undisputed

that there

(m R., p.982 (“In

it.

informed of the payroll
Title didn’t

want back

n0 evidence

there

is

some

act she did

(“It is clear

errors,

just the

that

wanted

may have

criminal deviate.”).

t0 not deduct

that the payroll software

To

moment

she

(or

was

But Pioneer

payroll errors.”); p.985 (“Furthermore,

evidence suggests that [Munson’s] payroll check error

work of a

ﬁmds, Munson did not cause

act With the intent to appropriate the funds; that

caused the payroll advance

from the evidence

lost

pay back whatever was owed

sum owed from

[Munson] did an

“Written Closing

of funds; Munson’s whole

loss

[Munson], right from the

fact,

to

(state’s

showed

trial).)

was an improper

theory of the case was that, While Pioneer

intend t0 cause)

pp.933-977

R.,

trial that

is

from her check”); pp.986-988

had inexplicable

errors.

This

systemic to the software, not the

the extent the civil settlement evidence also proved

Pioneer lost money, and other circumstances surrounding the

loss,

it

would have been

duplicative evidence.

Likewise, to the extent the civil settlement evidence showed a consciousness of

guilt, there

conscience,

was ample pre-settlement evidence
including her shocked,

civil

Munson was

that

Munson had

a guilty

(Rev. Tr., p.131

1,

Ls.4-10; p.1314, L.5-23.)

acquitted 0f one of the charges against her, which shows that the

settlement evidence had no

considered verdict.

showed

“extremely nervous,” and apparently nauseated

reaction to being confronted with the theft.

Lastly,

that

(R.,

improper effect on the

pp.1044-45.)

In

11

district

court’s

carefully

any event, because the “entire record

demonstrates overwhelming evidence upon Which” the court “rested

independent of
harmless.

civil settlement evidence,

State V. Joslin,

any such error

No. 45629, 2019

its

guilty verdict”

in admitting the evidence

WL 4941722,

was

*5 (Idaho Ct. App. Oct.

at

8,

2019)5
II.

Munson Fails T0 Show The

District Court

Payroll File Evidence; Alternatively,

A.

BV Admitting The
Any Such Error Was Harmless

Abused

Its

Discretion

Introduction

At

trial

Munson

electronic payroll ﬁle.

objected to State’s Exhibit

Her

obj ection took

10:

a screenshot of Munson’s

many forms below6

but 0n appeal she contends

that Exhibit 10 contains hearsay that does not fall “Within the business records exception

to the hearsay rule.”

(Rev. Appellant’s brief, p.17.) She argues that “the prosecution did

not present any evidence regarding

When

the evidence

course of a regularly conducted business actiVit

based 0n

its

”;

was made”;

“it

was not kept

and the exhibit was not

source “and the method and circumstances 0f its preparation.”

Munson

fails t0

show

error.

A review

it

erred,

be trusted

(Id.)

of the record shows that the

properly admitted Exhibit 10 as a business record, and even if

t0

in the

district court

any error was

harmless.

5

6

Joslin

is

a published opinion, but

is

not yet ﬁnal.

Munson’s objections below included a “best evidence”

objection,

the state did not lay sufﬁcient foundation for the payroll ﬁle.

p.1068, L.20 — p.1068,

hearsay objection.

(ﬂ

L.24; p.1079, Ls.22-24.) On appeal,
Rev. Appellant’s brief, pp. 1 5-22.)
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(R.,

and an objection

that

pp.285-86; Rev.

Tr.,

Munson

only presses her

Standard

B.

“When

Of Review7

reviewing the

0f discretion standard.”
(citing

Dulanev

V. St.

trial

court’s evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse

State V. Jones, 160 Idaho 449, 450,

Alphonsus Reg’l Med.

819-20 (2002)). “‘To determine whether a
considers Whether

it

its

whether

its

P.3d

reached

court has abused

its

discretion, this

it

Court

acted within

discretion and consistently With applicable legal standards, and

decision

280 (quoting Perry

at

trial

137 Idaho 160, 163-64, 45 P.3d 816,

correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, Whether

the boundaries 0f

it

Ctr.,

375 P.3d 279, 280 (2016)

V.

by an

exercise 0f reason.”

Magic Valley Reg’l Med.

m,

Ctr.,

160 Idaho

at

450, 375

134 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d

816, 821 (2000)).

C.

The Payroll
“‘Hearsay’

the

trial

File

is

Evidence

a statement other than one

made by

the declarant while testifying at

0r hearing, offered in evidence t0 prove the truth of the matter asserted.” I.R.E.

801. Hearsay

is

generally inadmissible. I.R.E. 802; State V. Conner, 161 Idaho 502, 505,

387 P.3d 170, 173
There

is

(Ct.

App. 2016).

an exception t0 the general hearsay rule for records kept in the course of

regularly conducted activities

ﬂ

Was An Admissible Business Record

Christensen

V.

(commonly

referred t0 as the “business record” exception,

Rice, 114 Idaho 929, 932, 763 P.2d 302, 305 (Ct. App. 1988)).

It

goes

as follows:

The following

are not excluded

Whether the declarant

7

The same standard 0f review

is

by

the rule against hearsay, regardless 0f

available as a Witness:

applies t0 Section

be rewritten.
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III

6)

Records 0f a

herein, but t0 conserve space will not

Regularly Conducted Activity.
opinion, or diagnosis

A

record 0f an

act,

condition,

event,

if:

made at or near the time by—or from information
transmitted by—someone with knowledge;

(A) the record was
(B) the record
activity

was kept

in the course

of a regularly conducted

0f a business, organization, occupation, or

calling,

Whether 0r not for proﬁt;
(C) making the record

(D)

all

was a regular practice 0f that activity;
shown by the testimony 0f the custodian

these conditions are

0r another qualiﬁed Witness, 0r

With Rule 902(1

by a

certiﬁcation that complies

1) or (12); and

show that the source of information or the
method 0r circumstances 0f preparation indicate a lack 0f

(E) the opponent does not

trustworthiness.

I.R.E. 803(6).

Business records “are admissible because the circumstances behind their

creation implies a high degree of veracit

”;

as such, “Business

Records possessing a

reasonable degree of necessity and trustworthiness are to be received in evidence unless

the

examination, doubts their reliability.”

trial court, after

(citing

Idaho Falls Bonded Produce and Supply Co.

V.

Li. at 933,

763 P.2d

306

at

General Mills Restaurant Group,

g, 105 Idaho 46, 49, 665 P.2d 1056, 1059 (1983)).
The person
“all that is

that “actually

necessary

is

[makes]” a business record “need not” authenticate

that the record

be authenticated by a person

the record as a regular part 0f his or her record.”

(1964)).

is

The

test is

Li

(citing

§ 682(3)

not Whether the custodian “has knowledge 0f the contents”; rather,

Recovery Assocs., LLC.

1266 (2017).

has custody 0f

32 C.J.S. Evidence

Whether the custodian “has knowledge of the system used

Portfolio

Who

it:

V.

to

make

it

the record.”

MacDonald, 162 Idaho 228, 233, 395 P.3d 1261,

Moreover, “minor alterations” t0 business records do not preclude

their

admission; such “alterations g0 t0 the weight given to the evidence, rather than

14

its

Christensen, 114 at 935, 763 P.2d at 308 (citing

admissibility.”

Hammond V. Hammond,

92 Idaho 623, 626, 448 P.2d 237, 240 (1968)).
Idaho case law makes clear that the admitted exhibit itselfdoes not need to be the
original business record.

For example, the Christensen Court concluded the magistrate

properly admitted a “loss control report” under the “business record exception t0 the

hearsay rule” after concluding “the nature of the report

surrounding

763 P.2d

its

making, substantiate

at 307.

But the original

as well as the circumstances

trustworthiness.” Christensen, 114 Idaho at 934,

loss report

admitted was “a copy of the original

Li.

its

itself,

was never admitted

letter sent t0

The document

at trial.

Rice after Mr. Pinkham’s inspection.”

Similarly, the Christensen Court concluded that the magistrate properly admitted “a

carbon copy of a

letter

from

M&M t0 Industrial Indemnity.”

Li For both

Court of Appeals did not discuss Whether the copies satisﬁed Rule 803(6);
for example,

Whether Pinkham regularly kept copies 0f

regularly kept carbon copies 0f the same.

EQ

it

exhibits, the

did not ask,

or Whether

letters,

Instead, the Court

M&M

was concerned with

Whether the original documents, and the information therein, satisﬁed the Rule.

Li.

Other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion. As explained by the court
in

Cavea

V.

CitiMortgage,

Inc.,

138 So. 3d 1214, 1217

Thi “[p]rintouts of data prepared for

trial

(Fla. Dist. Ct.

may be

App. 2014):

admitted under the

business records exception even if the printouts themselves are not kept in
the ordinary course ofbusiness so long as a qualiﬁed Witness testiﬁes as t0
the

manner 0f preparation,

(emphasis added) (citing Jackson

reliability,

V. State,

and trustworthiness.

877 So.2d 816, 817-18

Applying the foregoing standards, the
objection that State’s Exhibit 10

district court correctly

was inadmissible

15

(Fla.

hearsay.

4th

DCA 2004)).

overruled Munson’s

State’s Exhibit 10

was a

screenshot 0f Munson’s “employee master ﬁle” showing her hourly pay rate, earnings,

and deductions. (Rev.

p.1026, Ls.2-6; State’s EX. 108.) Pioneer Title’s current chief

Tr.,

ﬁnancial ofﬁcer, Cindy Truchot, testiﬁed that the screenshot was “right out of’ Pioneer
Title’s “system,”

and

that she

looked in the system, and

knew

it

was accurate because she had “gone

and

that

after

becoming suspicious about discrepancies

“around February” 0f 2014, she reported her ﬁndings to
p.1045, Ls.3-10; p.1061, L.3

“print[ed]

more checked

master ﬁle.” (Rev.

showed “where you go

— p.1066,

p.1066, L.17

Tr.,

and put

all

their insurance beneﬁts, sick time,”

best ofher

memory. (Rev.

Tr.,

Hedin then testiﬁed
took

L.6.)

At Bundgard’s

registers” for prior years,

in

Hedin testiﬁed

L.5.)

and afﬁrmed

was

that

— p.1068,

it

was

(Rev. Tr.,

went back and

“true

that Exhibit 10

far as their salary,

and accurate”

L.12.)

how

are

you familiar with

exact screenshot?

this exact

one—

Q. Yeah.

A:

—or any employee?

Q: That exact one.

State’s exhibit 10 can

t0 the

familiar with the screenshot because she herself

Q: So, going back to State’s Exhibit 10,

8

Pioneer

[Munson’s] employee

0f the employee’s information, as

p.1067, L.9

that she

request, Tina

at

at

Munson’s payroll

Tim Bundgard.

and “100k[ed]

— p.1067,

in

HR”

it:

A: Just

and

looks just like that.” (Rev. Tr., p.1039, Ls.3-12.)

it

Tina Hedin likewise testiﬁed that she worked in “payroll and

Title,

in there

be found on page 226 of the

16

PDF

ﬁle of exhibits.

that

A:

HOW am I familiar with it?

Q: Yes.

A: Ihad t0 pull

this

up

for

Tim t0

Q:

D0 you know how things

A:

How they get input?

take a 100k

get input [sic]

at.

on there?

Q: Like you talked about those end dates.

How do those get placed 0n that screen,
A:

You physically g0

in

on

that

master—

and change those 0n the computer.

Q: So, for one that’s in front of you—

A:

Um-hmm.

Q: —Exhibit 10,

Who would have been

doing

that.

A: I’m guessing [Munson].
Q:

Why do you guess

[Munson]?

A: Well, because she was the only one
not doing payroll in 2007.
Q:

You

A:

I

who had

access at the time.

could have gone into the system after 2010?

guess.

Q: But did you?

A:

I

Q:

D0 you know if you printed this

did not, n0.

State’s Exhibit 10 for

Tim?

A: Yes.
Q:

How did you do that?

A:

You just d0

Q: Has

it

it.

It’s

a print screen 0f the—on the computer.

been changed or altered

in

any way,

17

that

you can

tell?

I

was

A: N0.
(Rev. Tr., p.1074, L.24

— p. 1076,

Hedin then afﬁrmed

shown

L.15.)

one “would have

that

in State’s Exhibit 10, that “not just

were trained and knowledgeable
had “access t0”

it.

anyone can d0

in the payroll

(Rev. Tr., p.1077, L.15

t0 use a

L.10.)

that “only people

and

it,”

system”—that

— p.1078,

t0 get t0” the screen

password

is,

herself and

Hedin testiﬁed

Who

Munson—
was

that she

“not quite clear” on Whether the IT department had access t0 the payroll ﬁle, but afﬁrmed
that in her experience, IT

had never “gone

in

and changed someone’s pay of their master

payroll ﬁle.” (Rev. T11, p.1078, Ls.1 1-23.)

At

point the district court concluded that

this

objection to State’s Exhibit 10.

it

would overrule Munson’s

(Rev. Tr., p.1079, Ls.20-21.) This

was

because

correct,

Munson’s payroll ﬁle was an admissible business record under Rule 803(6).

Hedin’s and

Truchot’s testimony was that the payroll ﬁle contained end dates that had to be

“physically

chang[ed]” on the computer, and that

Munson was

the “only one

who had

access” t0 the payroll system in 2007, satisfying Rule 803(6)(A). (Rev. T11, p.1075, L.12

— p.1076,

L.6.)

The system

itself

was “the operating system

for [Pioneer Title’s]

accounting department” and the payroll ﬁle was “kept in the course of a regularly

conducted activity” Which was a “regular practice” for Pioneer Title—its “monthly cycle”
payroll practice. I.R.E. 803(6)(B), (C); (Rev. Tr., p.820, Ls.6-8; p.961, L.24

p.1021, Ls.8-13.)

Finally, despite

Munson’s attempts

neither the “source” 0f the payroll ﬁle nor “the

“preparation”—both described
trustworthiness.”

at

length

I.R.E. 803(6)(D), (E).

to

show otherwise on

18

L.4;

appeal,

method or circumstances of’

by Truchot and Hedin

As

— p.962,

its

“indicate a lack 0f

such, the payroll ﬁle

was an admissible

business record and

admitting

Munson

fails to

show

the district court abused

distinction

it,

between the screenshot

itself

fail

because they blur the fundamental

and the underlying payroll

argues as if the screenshot itself is the record

the screenshot

present

by

discretion

it.

Most 0f Munson’s arguments 0n appeal

Munson

its

was printed out

screenshot

is

At times

are concerned with; as she puts

“just as a one-time thing,

any information regarding When the

information contained in the

we

ﬁle.

99

66

the prosecution did not

was

screenshot

taken,”

and “[t]he

not regularly kept anywhere.”

(Rev.

Appellant’s brief, p.21 (quoting Rev. T11, p.1084, Ls.12-13).)

But

this

argument

fails.

The screenshot

itself

was not

the business record.

show

record was the payroll ﬁle, and, as such, the state was required to

met the requirements of 803(6), not

that the screenshot did.

We

The

the payroll ﬁle

can be certain 0f

this

because Idaho courts have already concluded that “carbon copies” of documents, and

documents are admissible “under the business record exception

“cop[ies] of original”

the hearsay rule.”

copies

Christensen, 114 Idaho at 934, 763 P.2d at 307.

the Christensen

were admissible under 803(6) because the underlying documents satisﬁed

803(6)—not because the copies satisﬁed the
asked

And

to

M&M

t0

prove that

copies, or Whether

it

it

rule.

EQ

The Christensen Court never

had the regularly conducted

activity

regularly kept “cop[ies] of’ original letters.

Christensen Court ask

M&M to prove when the copies were made.

of making carbon

EQ
EQ

Nor

did the

Instead, the

Christensen Court only cared that “the necessary foundation and authenticity were

provided by Mr. Pinkham[],”

copy 0f the

Who

testiﬁed, after an “inspection,” that “the

original letter”—precisely

what Hedin’s testimony provided

19

document

here. Li.

is

a

Moreover, Munson
803(6).

She claims

fails t0

show

the underlying payroll ﬁle did not satisfy Rule

that the payroll information

was not

“regularly kept” because

it

was

9

found in a “ﬁJIIy editable electronic form,” and that “once a change in the electronic
payroll system

is

But

brief, p.21.)

“record of an act”

made, there

is

no record 0f the previous information.”

this anti-entropic Vision

is

0f “regularly kept” cannot be

going t0 be “ﬁJIIy editable” in one

thing as immutably recorded information (and if there

to identify

it).

The Rule only

0f a regularly conducted
sense,

and frozen

in

99

existed before the screenshot

this case is

is

not Whether

for all time.

was

Munson makes no

at the

was “kept”

I.R.E. 803(6)(B).

also preserved

Munson’s payroll ﬁle

it

is

some

time Hedin looked

at

eternal

What

it,

no such

in the course

And whether

beside the point.

is

serious effort

was “kept

in

Every

correct.

or another—there

cares about whether the information

activity,

amber

way

(Appellant’s

cosmic

the data that

is

Which

relevant to

is

What the

screenshot shows. Because the payroll ﬁle itself was kept in the course of Pioneer Title’s
regularly conducted business, and satisﬁed Rule 803(6) in every other respect,

it

was

properly admitted.

Munson

argues that the payroll ﬁle

is

inadmissible because

multiple columns are cut off 0n the right side of the image.”

p.21.)

But

this ignores

it

“is incomplete, as

(Rev. Appellant’s brief,

Idaho precedent, Which hold that minor alterations—such as

missing columns in a spreadsheet—go to the weight, and not admissibility, 0f a business
record.

at

240.

Christensen, 114 at 935, 763 P.2d at 308;

She argues

the screenshot

Hammond, 92

that “the prosecution did not present

was taken” (Rev. Appellant’s

brief,

Idaho

at

626, 448 P.2d

any information regarding When

p.21), but this ignores Hedin’s

testimony that she began looking into the payroll discrepancies “probably around

20

February” of 2014, and that she printed the screenshot in

May of 2014

(Rev. TL, p.1059,

L.20 — p.1060, L.12; p.1 123, Ls.9-23).

Munson wraps up With

a roundabout conspiratorial shot at Hedin, implying that

Hedin’s eventual termination in 2015 shows she must have framed

Munson back in 2014:

Ms. Hedin printed the screenshot

to give t0 Mr. Bundgard
some point in May 2014), to support her suspicions that
Ms. Munson was not paying the employee portion of her beneﬁts. It is not
It

clear

is

(presumably

clear

at

when (and by whom)

the information contained in State’s Exhibit 10

was

Ms. Hedin testiﬁed she was
actually inputted in the payroll ﬁle.
“guessing Cindy” inputted the end dates 0n the exhibit, and she was “not
quite clear

Ms. Hedin later
was logged in as When she
Notably, Ms. Hedin was terminated by Pioneer

on whether IT had access

testiﬁed that she could not recall

printed the screenshot.

to the payroll ﬁle.

Who

she

accused 0f creating problems for [Cindy
succeeded Ms. Munson. These circumstances do

Title in January after being

Truchot,] the

CFO Who

not imply a high degree 0f veracity.
(Rev. Appellant’s brief, pp.21-22 (internal citations 0mitted).)

The

farfetched implication lurking here

the loose at Pioneer Title,

matter,

Munson

fails

to

is

that

Hedin was a

serial

troublemaker on

Whose Victim proﬁle was CFOs named Cindy. As a threshold

show

that this

argument was preserved.

State V.

Garcia-

Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (holding “parties will be held
t0 the theory

upon Which

hinted that Hedin

was not

the case

credible later

admitted, she did not explicitly

(Compare

R., pp.285-86;

was presented
on

Tr.,

lower court).

at trial, after State’s

make Hedin’s

Rev.

to the

credibility a basis

p.1068, L.20

— p.1072,

While Munson

Exhibit 10

was already

of her hearsay obj ection.
L.18; p.1079, Ls.24-25;

p.1081, Ls.15-16; p.1082, Ls.3-14; p.1084, Ls.16-20; p.1085, Ls.5-11; p.1089, Ls.9-20

with Rev.

Tr.,

p.1483, Ls.9-10.)
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Even assuming

this basis for the

ﬂatly denied that she ever said “she took
one.”

hearsay objection was preserved, Hedin herself

down one

Melanie

(Rev. T11, p.2133, Ls.12-15.)

Cindy, and she can take

Jurries,

down

another

an employee in accounts payable,

likewise testiﬁed that she “[n]ever heard anything remotely like that, ever.” (Rev. Tr.,

p.1883, Ls.16-23.)

problems for the

showing

that

CFO who

succeeded Ms. Munson,”

Munson

Hedin had any animus towards CFOS or Cindys

To

particular.

Other than repeating the accusation that Hedin was “creating

the contrary,

considered her a friend.

Hedin

“[got]

generally, or to

Munson

in

along with Munson”; liked Munson; and

— p.2134, L3.) Munson

(Rev. Tr., p.2133, L.12

that Hedin’s termination in

points t0 n0 evidence

2015 had anything

to

fails to

show

d0 With her discovery of Munson’s

crimes, and in any event, this argument goes to weight, not admissibility.

State’s Exhibit

10 met

admissible business record.

D.

all

Munson

Even Assuming Any

Error,

the criteria set forth in Rule 803(6) and

fails t0

show

was an

otherwise.

The Admission Of The Payroll

File

Evidence

Was

Harmless

Even

if the district court erred

by admitting

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The
set forth in Section

LE, supra.

And

example, the

state

had a strong case against Munson,

the payroll ﬁle evidence

hundreds of pages of evidence that showed
Title; for

state

the payroll ﬁle evidence, any error

was a

as

fraction of the

Munson improperly took money from

Pioneer

admitted Munson’s payroll registers from 2007 to 2014,

showing, month by month, her pay and deductions (State’s EX.6; Rev. Tr. p.1052, L.19 —
p.1053, L.10).

which shows

Furthermore,

Munson was

that the payroll ﬁle evidence

acquitted 0f one 0f the charges against her,

had n0 improper

22

effect

0n the

district court’s

carefully considered verdict.

(R.,

Because the “entire record demonstrates

pp.1044-45.)

overwhelming evidence upon which” the court “rested

its

guilty verdict” independent of

payroll ﬁle evidence, any such error in admitting the evidence

was harmless.

M,

N0.

WL 4941722, at *5.

45629, 2019

III.

Munson

Fails

T0 Show The

District

Court Abused

Polygraph Evidence; Alternatively,
A.

Discretion In Excluding

The

Any Such Error Was Harmless

Introduction

The

state

made

testiﬁed that

The

Munson took

Munson was being
The

a motion in limine to prohibit

(R., pp.751-52.)

expert.

to

Its

district court

motion

calling a polygraph

understanding was Munson’s expert would have

a polygraph

the results of

test,

0f events.

truthful about her version

Which purportedly showed

(E Rev.

submitted her

if

she could

own motion

t0 reconsider, seeking t0

ﬁnd

any. (Rev. Tr., p.699, L.14

in limine,

which the

district court

stipulation

fails t0

erred,

— p.701,

L. 12.)

construed as a

(R., p.775.)

The

denied Munson’s motion to reconsider, and granted the state’s motion,

excluding the polygraph evidence. (Rev.

On

Munson

admit the polygraph evidence, t0 “rebut any evidence or

testimony presented by the State to show consciousness 0f guilt.”
district court

p.696, Ls.10-25.)

Tr.,

concluded that polygraph evidence was inadmissible but asked

submit additional authority

Munson

state’s

Munson from

appeal

Munson

between the

fails to

parties,

show any exception

show

Tr.,

p.717, L.1

— p.718,

discretion.

Absent a

inadmissible in Idaho.

Munson

the district court abused

polygraph evidence

is

t0 that rule applies here.

any error was harmless.

23

L.14.)

its

Even assuming

the district court

Evidence

B.

Of Polygraph

Testing

Inadmissible Absent

Is

A

Stipulation

BV Both

Parties

For decades now, Idaho’s general rule has been that “results 0f polygraph
examinations are inadmissible absent a stipulation by both parties.”
Idaho 82, 86, 774 P.2d 252, 256 (1989) (overruled
Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991)); State

558 (1999); State

m,

V.

V.

Q other grounds

Cir.

The

201

13y State V.

Grubs, 126 Idaho 377, 385, 883 P.2d 1069, 1077 (1994); State
V.

Hang, 638 F.3d

V.

1027,

1).

parties here did not stipulate t0 admit the polygraph evidence.

pp.751-752.)

Card, 121

Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 894, 980 P.2d 552,

139 Idaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230, 1235 (2003); Rhoades

1034 (9th

State V. Fain, 116

(E

R.,

Accordingly, a straightforward application 0f the law shows the district

court’s exclusion of the inadmissible polygraph evidence

was

correct.

(Rev. Tr., p.717,

L.23 — p.718, L.14.)

On

appeal

Munson

fails t0

show

this

was an abuse of

discretion.

essentially ignores the decades—old line 0f precedent holding that “results

First,

she

of polygraph

examinations are inadmissible absent a stipulation by both parties.” FLin, 116 Idaho
86,

774 P.2d

883 P.2d
this

at

at

256; Tre_vino, 132 Idaho at 894, 980 P.2d at 558;

1077; P1131, 139 Idaho at 525, 81 P.3d at 1235.

t0

Owens, 158 Idaho

1,

is

4-5,

remedy continued

343 P.3d 30, 33-34 (2015)
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385,

manifestly wrong, has

be unjust or unwise, or overruling that precedent

vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and

at

“Stare decisis requires that

Court follows controlling precedent unless that precedent

proven over time

Gibe, 126 Idaho

at

is

m

necessary t0

injustice.”

(citing State V. Grant,

154 Idaho

281, 287, 297 P.3d 244, 250 (2013)).

Because Munson has not bothered

overruling the controlling precedent that seals her fate here, her arguments

Even

if this

precedent was not controlling,

Munson

fails t0

exception to the general bar on polygraph admissibility exists.

extra—jurisdictional

cases,

that,

to

various

degrees,

She

pp.27-28.)

Munson

cites a

(ﬂ Rev.

that

preferred

handful 0f

polygraph

Appellant’s brief,

faults the district court for “conclud[ing] its decision

Munson

Perry”;

fail.

show her

have concluded

evidence would be admissible for reasons similar t0 hers.

t0 talk about

was bound by

contends, instead, the “district court should have looked to the lead

United States Supreme Court case 0n the admission of expert testimony, Daubert
Merrell

Dow Pharmaceuticals,

expert testimony proffered here

v.

Ina, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and should have concluded the

was admissible.” (Rev. Appellant’s

brief, p.26.)

But the existence of differing conclusions about polygraph evidence around the
country only
V. Scheffer,

hammers home

the post-Daubert decision that matters here. In United States

523 U.S. 303, 312 (1998), the United States Supreme Court concluded that a

per se exclusion 0f polygraph evidence was a “rational and proportional means of

advancing the legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence”:

Although the degree of reliability of polygraph evidence

may depend upon
know in a

simply no way t0
particular case Whether a polygraph examiner’s conclusion
a variety of identiﬁable factors, there

is

is

accurate,

because certain doubts and uncertainties plague even the best polygraph

exams. Individual jurisdictions therefore

may reasonably reach

differing

conclusions as t0 whether polygraph evidence should be admitted.

We

cannot say, then, that presented with such widespread uncertainty, the
President acted arbitrarily or disproportionately in promulgating a per se
rule excluding all polygraph evidence.

(emphasis added).

25

Scheffer, as

it

happens, was directly cited in one of the Idaho cases afﬁrming the

propriety of the general rule rejecting polygraph evidence:

The

district court

Fain,

where

did not admit the polygraph results, relying on State

v.

Court held the results of polygraph examinations

this

inadmissible absent a stipulation

polygraph testimony

is

by both parties, regardless 0f Whether the
Under ScheZZer, where the decision t0

exculpatory.

admit polygraph evidence

is left

up

that the district court acted within

we hold

t0 the individualjurisdictions,

proposed
ruling the polygraph results

discretion in rejecting the

its

use 0f the polygraph in this case and in
inadmissible.

Trevino, 132 Idaho at 894, 980 P.2d at 558 (emphasis added). Because the United States

Supreme Court leaves the polygraph question up

t0 individual jurisdictions, a handful

jurisdictions that disagree with Idaho should not persuade this Court to

abandon

its

of

own

repeatedly stated general rule.

Munson

Finally,

fails

to

show

discusses t0 on the polygraph front,

pp.26-27.)

inadmissible.

would change any of

at

522, 81 P.3d at 1232.

appellant’s arguments that the polygraph evidence

that the polygraph expert

Per_ry,

the lone Idaho case she

this.

(E Appellant’s brief,

Court restated the general ruled—polygraph evidence

In Per_ry this

139 Idaho

that State V.

would not “usurp

The

Per_ry

is

Court considered the

was generally accepted science and

the fact-ﬁnding role of the jury.” Li. at 522,

81 P.3d at 1232.

The Pegy Court shot

this theory

down, noting

are useﬁll to bolster Perry’s credibility,” that

would “not provide

additional information that pertains t0 Perry’s case.”

“credibility questions are left to the trier

that while “results

0f

admitting the polygraph evidence would “not help the

26

the trier of fact with any

Li. at 525, 81

fact, in this

P.3d

case a jury.”

trier

of

0f the polygraph

fact t0

at 1235.

And,

Li.

Because

ﬁnd

facts or t0

understand the evidence” and would “usurp[] the role of the jury as the ultimate ﬁnder of
credibility,” the

Peg Court concluded the polygraph evidence was inadmissible.

After dismantling Perry’s proposed exception,

the

Li.

Court took yet another

opportunity to restate the general rule:

In

ruling

that

credibility

may be

polygraph evidence

of a Witness

admissible

at trial, this

instances

in

is

inadmissible to vouch for the

Court notes that polygraph evidence

where the parties

stipulate

t0

the

admission 0f the evidence, in probation revocation hearings, and in other
informal hearings where the rules 0f evidence d0 not apply, at the
discretion of the trial court or presiding ofﬁcial. This opinion does not

touch on the efﬁcacy of the polygraph
except as t0 jury and court
Li. (internal citations omitted,

So

Per_ry

trials

Simply because the

carve out Perry’s sought-after exception does not

speciﬁcally addressed in

show

evidence

9

And

Per_ry,

mean

just because the exception

does not

mean

her exception

show

And

is

(E Rev. Appellant’s brief, 29.)

To

Per_ry

Court declined t0

the general rule of inadmissibility

that in Idaho, polygraph evidence is admissible “t0

0f innocence.”9

to

this State.

emphasis added).

does not help Munson.

does not otherwise apply.

tests in other contexts or uses,

conducted in

Munson

now

show

exists.

seeks

was not

Munson

fails t0

subjective consciousness

the contrary, in Idaho, polygraph

inadmissible absent a stipulation between the parties.

Munson

therefore fails

the district court erred in excluding the polygraph evidence.

Munson’s proposed statement 0f law was correct—if willingness t0 take a
polygraph was admissible to show “subjective consciousness 0f innocence,” then the
if

inverse should be true as well—unwillingness t0 take a polygraph should be admissible t0

show a consciousness of
proposed exception

is

guilt.

This disruptive unintended side effect of Munson’s

yet another reason not to reinvent the general rule of polygraph

inadmissibility.
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Even

C.

If

The

District

Court Erred In Excluding The Polygraph Evidence The Error

Was Harmless
Even

if the district court erred

by excluding

the polygraph evidence, any error

was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The state had a strong case against Munson, as set
forth in Section I.E, supra.

evidence as

And

t0 the extent

Munson

evidence 0f “subjective consciousness

sought t0 admit the polygraph

0f innocence,” and admit her

“willingness to take a polygraph test” as “circumstantial evidence 0f consciousness of

innocence,” that evidence was already before the district court.

(Rev. Appellant’s brief,

pp.28-29.)

Munson took

the stand and testiﬁed that the unauthorized checks

were actually

authorized, and that she did not “enter end dates reﬂected in State’s Exhibit 10 in order t0

steal

far

from Pioneer

more

polygraph
polygraph

Title.” (Rev. Tr., p.2231, L.7

direct evidence

test

— p.2233,

L. 10.)

Her own testimony was

0f her “subjective consciousness of innocence” than any

could have offered.

Moreover, t0 the extent mere Willingness t0 take a

showed “circumstantial evidence 0f consciousness of innocence,” her

willingness t0 testify

showed

the

Because the “entire record demonstrates

same.

overwhelming evidence upon which” the court “rested
polygraph evidence, any such error in admitting

WL 4941722, at *5.
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it

its

guilty verdict” independent of

was harmless.

m,

N0. 45629, 2019

IV.

Munson Fails T0 Show The
A.

District Court

Abused

Its

Discretion In Sentencing

district court

abused

its

discretion

Introduction

Munson

contends the

aggregate twenty—year prison sentence, With four years ﬁxed.
pp.30-34.) She has failed t0

B.

Munson

Standard

show an abuse of sentencing

by sentencing her

to

an

(Rev. Appellant’s brief,

discretion.

Of Review

“Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”

Anderson, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State

V.

State

V.

Wersland, 125

Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)).

C.

Munson

Fails

T0 Show The

District Court

Abused

Its

Discretion In Sentencing

H_er

Where

a sentence

is

Within statutory limits, an appellant

that the sentence is a clear abuse

P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State
carry this burden,

View of the

facts.

of discretion.

136 Idaho

State V. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38

Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).

V.

Munson must show
Ba_ker,

required t0 establish

is

that her sentence is excessive

at

577, 38 P.3d at 615.

A

under any reasonable

sentence

is

reasonable if

appropriate to achieve the primary objective of protecting society, and any or
related sentencing goals 0f deterrence, rehabilitation, 0r retribution.

Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978).

The Court reviews

T0

the

all

0f the

State V. Wolfe, 99

whole sentence on

appeal and presumes that the ﬁxed portion of the sentence Will be the defendant’s

probable term 0f conﬁnement.

(2007).

State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391

In deference t0 the trial judge, the Court will not substitute

29

its

View 0f a

reasonable sentence Where reasonable minds might

State V. Toohill, 103 Idaho

differ.

565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).

At

the sentencing hearing, the district court heard from Pioneer Title’s

Bundgard.

(4/28/17 TL, p.10, L.16

“systematically stole from those

the trust bestowed

[her] as a licensed

on

[her],”

who

—

He

p.16, L.14.)

relied

on

told the court that

[her] to protect the

and “violated every moral and

CPA and a CFO

company,

9)

Munson
‘6

violated

ethical standard required

Company.” (4/28/17

for Pioneer Title

CEO, Tim

of

Tr., p.1 1, Ls.8-

13.)

Bundgard went 0n

t0 point out that

Munson’s

theft “occurred during the

time in

which the company was carefully navigating through the Great Recession.” (4/28/17 TL,
p.1

1,

Ls. 14-18.)

According to Bundgard, “during

that period, the

lay off valuable employees” because Pioneer Title “believed

income
while,

to justify continuing

Munson

employment.” (4/28/17

employees.” (4/28/17
other

L.18 — p.12, L.1.) A11 the

“deliberately stole hundreds of thousands 0f dollars each year

company’s income, Which could have been used
Tr., p.12, Ls.2-7.)

damage Munson’s

to at least maintain

Bundgard noted

this

was

from the

some 0f those

in addition to all the

theft did to Pioneer Title’s abilities t0 serve its shareholders,

endure the ensuing regulatory scrutiny, and protect

its

reputation.

(4/28/ 17 Tr., p.12, L.8

— p. 1 3, L6.)

And Bundgard discussed Munson’s motivations

for

it all:

From what I know, you did not steal to fund an addiction 0r t0 pay medical
due to some mental illness. You stole, quite simply, because you

bills or

You

You

because you felt entitled to other people’s money.
stole from the same people that paid you handsomely t0 protect them

wanted

t0.

and d0 the

to

did not generate enough

it

Tr., p.1 1,

company was forced

stole

right thing for them.
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T0 me,

that

addiction t0

more egregious than if you had a valid
fund 0r ﬁnancial hardships to overcome. Your callous actions
form of

theft is far

created signiﬁcant consequences not only to yourself and certainly to your
family, but to the

Sadly,

you have

company,

yet, in

my

its

employees and shareholders.

opinion, t0 express any feelings of remorse or

sincere culpability for your actions. During the course of this

you
you
portrayed me and the company as bad actors. Everything you can convey
t0 this court centered around you believing that you were the Victim. For
example, you claimed it was software error. You claimed it was just an
portrayed yourself—excuse me,

oversight.

You

claimed

it

during the course 0f this

wasn’t your

trial,

trial,

intent.

Cindy, none 0f your accusations—or none 0f your excuses, excuse me, are
grounded in fact. It wasn’t software. It wasn’t an oversight. It was your

was you. You did

intent. It

did

it

t0 this

ﬁmds

did

it

company. You’re not a Victim. You’re a

(4/28/17 Tr., p.13, L.23

— p.15,

to

your family.

You

thief.

L.4.)

Bundgard expressed a concern

Finally,

You

t0 yourself.

it

in the civil settlement, that she

that because

Munson

repaid the stolen

might receive a more lenient sentence:

“I

am

hopeful this court will recognize that a lenient sentence sends the wrong message,”

namely, “that you can commit a crime but not have to suffer serious consequences, as
long as you pay

The

back When you’re caught.” (4/28/17

district

imprisonment
decision

it

is

court

concluded,

warranted in

was based 0n “the

Munson “was

With

this case.”

L.5

“heavy heart,”

a

— p.16, L9.)

that

“a

(4/28/17 Tr., p.68, Ls.13-17.)

fact that a felony

in the highest position

Tr., p.15,

sentence

The

0f

court’s

crime occurred year after year” While

of trust as the

CFO

for Pioneer Title.” (4/28/17 Tr.,

p.68, Ls.9-13.)

And

the

district

protection 0f the public”

the

seriousness

0f the

court

in

particular

agreed that imprisoning

was appropriate because:
defendant’s

crime”;

31

2)

1)

a lesser sentence

Munson

“for

would “depreciate

imprisonment would “provide

an

would

appropriate punishment and deterrent t0 the defendant”; and 3) imprisonment

“provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons in the community.”

p.67, L.1

—

p.68, L.1.)

The

district court

accordingly sentenced

sentence of twenty years imprisonment, With four years ﬁxed.

Munson

(4/28/17 Tr.,

t0

an aggregate

(4/28/17 TL, p.68, L.18

—

p.69, L.5.)

On

appeal

Munson

show

fails to

was an abuse 0f discretion.

this

First,

Munson

concedes the seriousness 0f her crimes, but argues they “did not warrant a term of
incarceration” because she claims “[t]hey did not impact the success 0f Pioneer Title.”

(Rev. Appellant’s brief, 3 1 .) This

is

not only unsupported, but

it

ignores

Tim Bundgard’s

testimony that Munson’s theft not only affected Pioneer Title as a company, but that the

“hundreds of thousands of dollars” she stole each year “could have been used to
maintain some of those employees”

p.1

1,

laid off during the recession.

(4/28/17 T11,

L.14 —p.12, L.7.)

On

the subject of the stolen

compensated Pioneer

And

who were

at least

Title for

she claims, “[i]n

fact,

it

any

money, Munson next argues

loss that

appears Ms.

it

suffered.”

Munson

that

Munson

“fully

(Rev. Appellant’s brief, p.31.)

paid more to Pioneer Title than she

actually owed.” (Rev. Appellant’s brief, p.19 (emphasis added).)

This

because

fails t0

Munson

you pay

margins
steal

it

this

more

repaid the

money

Tr., p.15,

deter future would-be thieves, but

carefully (and save

up

Giving a lighter sentence

all

it

sends the

L.25 — p.16, L.4.)

would only

for a civil settlement, just in case).
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wrong;

to suffer serious consequences, as long

back When you’re caught.” (4/28/17

would not

discretion.

she stole gets the incentives

you can commit a crime but not have

signal “that

as

show an abuse 0f sentencing

incentivize

On

the

them

to

Munson goes on

She catalogues her educational

t0 talk about her character.

background, her career history, her commitment to her family, and her
“substance abuse issues,”

among

decries that “[t]he sentence

district court

of

Munson

(Rev. Appellant’s brief, p.32.)

other things.

imposed by the

total lack

did not account” for her family,

“and harms society as a whole by keeping [Munson] out 0f the workforce.

(Rev.

Appellant’s brief, p.32.)

No

one would deny

mitigating, nor does

it

this

information about Munson’s

Munson’s

credit

life is positive.

character, that she stole

But

it is

not

from her company despite

her intelligence and background in business accounting; despite the accomplished career

that she

was jeopardizing; and

many

despite having so

relationships

and other positive

things in her life to lose.

Neither

is

it

mitigating that

Munson

has “no substance abuse issues.”

Appellant’s brief, p.32.) In Idaho the opposite

abuse issue. State

V. Miller,

is true: it is

is

punishment upon sentencing”) (quoting State
n. 5 (1981)).

mitigating t0 have a substance

151 Idaho 828, 836, 264 P.3d 935, 943 (201 1) (“[A]1though

not a defense t0 the crime, ‘substance abuse

P.2d 187, 196

(Rev.

Because, as

an addiction” can be understood,

if

a proper consideration in mitigation of

V.

Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414

Tim Bundgard

not condoned.

put

it,

n. 5,

at least “steal[ing] to

(ﬂ 4/28/17

T11, p.13,

L.23

—

631

fund
p.14,

L.7.)

Munson’s pervasive
skills,

career-

and family—risking theft—despite her

and her lack 0f addiction—suggests she was not motivated by a desperate ﬁnancial

situation or a powerful addiction; rather,

This

is

intelligence, her

it

suggests she

not mitigating.
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was simply motivated by

greed.

Munson

Lastly,

argues that:

The sentence imposed upon Ms. Munson was not necessary

good
order and protection 0f society. In all likelihood, incarcerating Ms.
Munson Will cause her, her family, and the entire community to be less
protected rather than more protected... Denise McClure, a CPA and
certiﬁed fraud examiner, testiﬁed at sentencing that, in her opinion, Ms.
Munson was not likely to reoffend because she did not ﬁt the proﬁle of a
Ms. Munson also voluntarily surrendered her CPA
typical embezzler.
license

prior

t0

sentencing,

reducing

further

for the

likelihood

the

0f her

committing a ﬁnancial crime.
(Rev. Appellant’s brief, pp.33-34 (internal citations 0mitted).)

Munson’s
after this theft,

easily reoffend;

Munson had
she

fails to

show

was working

that trusted

community.

even

for another

company, “training

become

the

CFO.”

t0

be Corporate

(PSI, p.65.)

As

such,

the court’s concerns about deterrence were overblown.

Munson abused
employer

that

already found herself in another position Where she could

Controller with the opportunity to eventually

Munson

The record shows

optimistic assessment misses the mark.

a position 0f trust and repeatedly stole signiﬁcant

her.

Given What she

Her
did,

thefts

harmed her company, her

Munson

fails t0

show

sums from an

family,

and her

the district court abused

its

discretion in sentencing her.

CONCLUSION
The
rulings and

state respectﬁllly requests this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s evidentiary

afﬁrm the judgment 0f conviction.

DATED this 2lst day 0f October, 2019.

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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